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Abstract
Background: In 2009, the U.S. Preventive Services Task Force released new mammography screening guidelines
that sparked a torrent of criticism. The subsequent conflict was significant and pitted the Task Force against other
health organizations, advocacy groups, the media, and the public at large. We argue that this controversy was
driven by the systematic removal of uncertainty from science communication. To increase comprehension and
adherence, health information communicators remove caveats, limitations, and hedging so science appears simple
and more certain. This streamlining process is, in many instances, initiated by researchers as they engage in
dissemination of their findings, and it is facilitated by public relations professionals, journalists, public health
practitioners, and others whose tasks involve using the results from research for specific purposes.
Analysis: Uncertainty is removed from public communication because many communicators believe that it is difficult
for people to process and/or that it is something the audience wants to avoid. Uncertainty management theory posits
that people can find meaning and value in uncertainty. We define key terms relevant to uncertainty management,
describe research on the processing of uncertainty, identify directions for future research, and offer recommendations
for scientists, practitioners, and media professionals confronted with uncertain findings.
Conclusions: Science is routinely simplified as it is prepared for public consumption. In line with the model of
information overload, this practice may increase short-term adherence to recommendations at the expense of
long-term message consistency and trust in science.
Introduction
In 2009, the U.S. Preventive Services Task Force (USPSTF)
announced a change in mammography guidelines, a
recommendation that sparked a torrent of criticism [1-3].
Previously, the USPSTF recommended a B grade for
mammography screening every 1 to 2 years for women
age 40 and older. A B grade means, “The USPSTF recom-
mends the service. There is high certainty that the net
benefit is moderate or there is moderate certainty that the
net benefit is moderate to substantial” [4]. In 2009, the
USPSTF altered their recommendations such that biennial
screening for women from age 50 to 74 received a B grade
and biennial screening for women from age 40 to 49 was
downgraded to a C grade. A C grade means, “Clinicians
may provide this service to selected patients depending on
individual circumstances. However, for most individuals
without signs or symptoms there is likely to be only a
small benefit from this service” [4]. The new recommenda-
tion of the USPSTF was challenged by other organizations
and patient advocacy groups as it was in direct conflict
with the guidelines that had been communicated—by
those groups and the USPSTF—for years [2].
One interpretation of this controversy is that the
USPSTF encountered problems not because their mes-
sage was perceived as unsubstantiated or inaccurate, but
rather that it deviated from recommendations of the past
in a fairly significant manner. Past communication about
mammography had focused on a simple message:
Women should have an annual mammogram starting at
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age 40 because screening saves lives. This message was a
central component of health education efforts devoted to
cancer, and advocacy groups were mobilized across the
United States in support of retaining annual mammo-
graphic screening as recommended practice. However,
the uncertainties of the benefits and harms associated
with annual mammography were rarely included in these
advocacy efforts. The USPSTF had acknowledged these
uncertainties in its own reports, but changing the result-
ing recommendation based on these uncertainties created
the appearance of a discrepant message or a flip-flop [3].
Changing the recommendation for women aged 40–49
from a B grade to a C grade suggested that the USPSTF
had incorrectly categorized the certainty of the mammo-
graphy in the past (i.e., it went from high/moderate cer-
tainty to uncertain).
It is clear in hindsight that the USPSTF members did
not fully appreciate how contradictory their recommenda-
tion was or the potential backlash it would invoke at the
time that the recommendation was published [4]. The
researchers and research-oriented practitioners who com-
prised the USPSTF believed that there were significant
uncertainties concerning the value of mammography
screening. Those uncertainties were known within the
research community, and results from simulation research
were starting to suggest the need for alterations in the
screening guidelines [1]. Unfortunately, the USPSTF mem-
bers and other contributors to the effort did not appreciate
how the new recommendation would be received by mem-
bers of the public (e.g., women at risk, community-based
clinicians, public health officials) that had been steeped in
messages about the value of annual screening mammogra-
phy for decades. Nor did they appreciate how the public
would perceive a downgrade in their recommendation.
The controversy over mammography guidelines raises
significant questions about the communication of health
recommendations, including: What went wrong in this
situation? Who had responsibility for the significant mis-
judgment concerning the public reaction? How could it
have been avoided? Based on these questions, we argue
that this controversy is a predictable response to the sys-
tematic removal of uncertainty from the public commu-
nication of scientific content; a problem that undermines
the credibility of science and confuses the public [5-10].
In other words, the 2009 mammography controversy was
symptomatic of larger structural problems undermining
the public dissemination of science rather than an iso-
lated incident. The goal of this article is to articulate how
conflicts of this type arise and to review possible means
of redress.
Background
The public learns about research primarily through media
—television, the Internet, and newspapers. These channels
are used to convey recommendations from official entities
(e.g., the USPSTF), the results of single studies, and/or the
accumulation of decades of research evidence [11]. This
approach is necessary because few people have direct
access to the research enterprise. Thus, the media dissemi-
nate research findings—a somewhat uncomfortable situa-
tion that often places media-focused enterprises and
outlets at the center of scientific debates [12].
To understand the tension of this dissemination pro-
cess, it is pivotal to know that scientists and journalists
have distinct professional norms that often conflict [7].
Scientists value uncertainty, and this leads them to favor
hedged discourse and longer, denser prose [13,14]. Jour-
nalists value concise narratives that represent myriad
perspectives to achieve balanced coverage [15,16]. One
can easily see this tension by comparing an academic
journal article to its subsequent news coverage. Such
comparisons reveal that news coverage of research often
maximizes conflict by providing space to divergent
voices—which are routinely manufactured or magnified
to maximize conflict—and frequently omits the caveats,
limitations, and uncertainties presented in the original
journal reports [7,9,10,12,17-20]. For example, Lai and
Lane [21] found that 43% of front-page newspaper stor-
ies about science were based on preliminary evidence.
Of those stories, only 18% were described as preliminary
or mentioned the limitations of the research.
Conflicting professional norms have led scientists to go
through periods of media engagement and withdrawal. In
the early 1900s, scientists embarked on a period of media
engagement driven largely by the efforts of the Progressives
—a term used to describe groups involved in a massive
reform movement in the United States from approximately
1890 to 1920— who viewed research as the guiding force
of reform [22]. During the Progressive Era, scientists were
trained to streamline their messages when communicating
with the public to ensure that science was the voice of
authority in matters of policy [14,15]. This period of media
engagement was followed by a significant withdrawal near
the middle of the 20th century. The rationale for withdraw-
ing was articulated best by Popper, who argued that science
needed to embrace uncertainty and abandon the desire “to
be right” ([23] p. 280-281). Moreover, concerns about the
relationship between science and the media ultimately led
others to eschew publication of research that was prema-
turely disseminated to the public. For example, Franz
Ingelfinger, editor of the New England Journal of Medicine
from 1967–1976, decreed in 1969 that his journal would
no longer publish research that had been released to the
media in advance, as “premature publicity about medical
research and publicity about work that has not yet been
documented cause confusion among laymen and the pro-
fession alike” ([24] p.825). Ingelfinger’s policy still allowed
for interactions between scientists and media professionals,
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but only after research had been sufficiently vetted by the
peer review process. Thus, Ingelfinger advocated a divide
between scientists and media professionals to protect
scientific inquiry from the negative influences of hasty pub-
lic dissemination. Both Popper and Ingelfinger seemed to
appreciate that media professionals value a definitive claim,
and that once that claim is made it could undermine or
jeopardize scientific credibility.
More recently, science seems to be moving back
toward engagement. Scientists are once again seeking
training in how to interact with media professionals
[25,26]. Not surprisingly, this training often focuses on
simplifying scientific statements so they appear more cer-
tain and (presumably) more lucid for nonscientists. The
Progressives supported this approach to solidify scientists
as key decision makers, but modern advocates of simplifi-
cation are interested in increasing comprehension and
adherence among members of larger audiences, including
the general public. The health literacy and plain language
movements, for example, both posit that crafting scienti-
fic information for public consumption is primarily a
process of simplification [27]. The logic seems to be that
many problems in the communication environment
could be solved by the removal of scientific jargon and/or
extraneous verbiage.
As science returns to media engagement, some have
cautioned that effective communication of scientific
information should be guided by the philosophy of
science (e.g., Popper’s caution about avoiding the “need
to be right”) and a growing body of literature evaluating
the benefits and harms of removing uncertainty from
scientific discourse [8,27]. The basic assumption of this
approach is that conflict among scientists, the media, and
the public will occur, but the emergence of such conflict
should be a secondary concern among those charged
with the communication of scientific information. Their
primary concern should be to foster a conversation that
includes uncertainty, rather than streamlining messages
to achieve (what are often) short-term objectives in con-
veying a specific point. In the analysis section, the logic,




Two key terms need to be defined for this discussion:
streamlining and uncertainty. Streamlining is the process
of removing information as a message moves through
communication channels. In science, Star [28] argued that
streamlining often begins with researchers as they omit
countless details from their research reports. Of course,
streamlining is necessary as it is impossible to include all
details in a message. For example, researchers might note
that the temperature of their laboratory was kept at 72 F
during the study but fail to mention relative humidity (as
they view that as irrelevant). The streamlining process
continues as research is moved forward by researchers
positioning their work for publication and after publica-
tion as public relations professionals craft shorter press
releases to drive media coverage. Journalists further
streamline the material to fit the space requirements of
their publication, and additional streamlining may occur
when news coverage is reappropriated by bloggers, social
media, or even in interpersonal conversation.
What information is streamlined in science communica-
tion? Two factors are systematically removed during the
streamlining process: lexical complexity and uncertainty.
Scientific discourse is more lexically complex than other
forms of communication [29], and the removal of jargon
or multisyllabic terms is standard practice when preparing
a document for public consumption [27]. This practice
often lowers the reading level of the message, which may
benefit audiences with lower literacy [30], although the
costs and benefits of reducing lexical complexity have yet
to be fully investigated [27].
In an effort to reduce lexical complexity, communicators
frequently cut uncertainty from the message as well.
Uncertainty is both a perception and a message feature. A
person can feel uncertain and a message can convey
uncertainty. Brashers argued that uncertainty is a complex
self-perception that a situation is “ambiguous, complex,
unpredictable, or probabilistic,” and it occurs “when infor-
mation is unavailable or inconsistent” ([31] p.478). As a
message feature, uncertainty is cut to reduce lexical com-
plexity and because many communicators believe that
audiences want to reduce or avoid uncertainty [32-34].
Uncertainty management theory, on the other hand, posits
that people sometimes prefer uncertainty [31]. Identifying
when and why people prefer uncertainty is the primary
objective of uncertainty management research.
Uncertainty in science comes in at least two forms: lexi-
cal and discourse-based [35]. Lexical uncertainty occurs
when a communicator uses hedging (e.g., may, if, perhaps,
might) to suggest uncertainty. “Blueberries may prevent
throat cancer” is a claim with lexical uncertainty whereas
“blueberries prevent throat cancer” does not contain lexi-
cal uncertainty. Discourse-based uncertainty occurs when
a communicator provides a reason that a claim is uncer-
tain. For instance, if researchers note that a study used
tomato powder instead of tomatoes, and thus the impact
of tomatoes is still unknown, that would be an example of
discourse-based uncertainty.
Streamlining, uncertainty, and the public
communication of science
Public communication of science moves fast, perhaps faster
than scientists recognize. The desire for definitive informa-
tion on pressing issues of the day can foster a culture of
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short, overly certain messages that seem to change over
time. An infamous example of this tendency is news cover-
age of margarine and butter. For several decades, research-
ers have examined the relative health benefits of margarine
and butter. Individual studies have yielded data supporting
one or the other (and sometimes neither), which has led to
a series of stories touting margarine over butter, then but-
ter over margarine, then margarine over butter, and so on
[36,37]. Research on this topic is relatively uncertain, yet
news coverage has often presented the issue as certain and
in line with the findings of each new study. The margarine-
versus-butter storyline is typical of news coverage in that
science is often presented in brief stories that seem to flip-
flop over time [38]. This flip-flopping is driven by journalis-
tic norms that cut lexical and discourse-based uncertainty
and favor conflict and newsworthiness [39].
Despite a renewed interest in simplification, the reality is
that public communication of science typically is simple
(in the short term), and this fact can produce confusion
(in the long term). For example, the controversy about the
USPSTF mammography guidelines was predicated by dec-
ades of simple, adherence-focused communication. Simple
messages advocating annual mammography increased
adherence among U.S. women over 40 years of age from
29% in 1987 to 70.4% in 2000 [40]. Streamlining commu-
nication may maximize behavioral response, but that same
simplicity potentially triggers backlash if the recommenda-
tion needs to be changed. In other words, the controversy
about the USPSTF mammography guidelines was, in
many respects, a classic margarine-versus-butter situation.
Uncertainty and the public
Research suggests that many adults have limited health
and science literacy [27]. In light of these skill deficien-
cies, communicating scientific uncertainty to the public
may sound like a misguided idea. However, lexical com-
plexity and uncertainty are distinct message features.
That is, there is nothing about uncertainty that requires
lexical complexity. For example, the following sentences
are written at a first-grade reading level (Flesch-Kincaid
Grade Level = 0.6), contain no passive sentences, and
have a reading ease score of 100%: “This study used mice.
Mice and people are not the same. We do not know if it
will work in people.” In terms of science literacy, existing
measures of this construct do not test comprehension of
scientific uncertainty; therefore, the public’s ability to
process uncertain scientific statements is still largely
unknown [34].
What is known is that, among the public, there is wide-
spread fatalism and overload concerning health informa-
tion. The Health Information National Trends Survey
(HINTS) is a national survey of U.S. adults conducted
approximately every other year. Focused primarily on
cancer, the HINTS data have shown that: 27% of adults
believe, “There’s not much people can do to lower their
chances of getting cancer”; 41% agree with the statement,
“It seems like almost everything causes cancer”; and
71.5% express the view that, “There are so many recom-
mendations about preventing cancer, it’s hard to know
which ones to follow” [41]. The first two beliefs are
examples of cancer fatalism, whereas the last belief is
cancer information overload [42]. Adults who embrace
ideas associated with higher fatalism and overload are
less likely to engage in cancer prevention and detection
behaviors [42,43].
Importantly, fatalism and information overload are
negatively correlated with education [42,44]. That is, peo-
ple with less education are more likely to exhibit fatalism
and overload. This relationship suggests that education
provides something that allows adults to process cancer
information without triggering negative reactions. It is
possible that education provides the basic literacy and
numeracy skills necessary to comprehend news coverage
of research (news coverage is typically written at a ninth-
grade reading level [45]). It is also possible that education
provides a context for understanding news coverage.
Research to date has shown that including discourse-
based uncertainty in news coverage of cancer research
decreases cancer fatalism and nutritional backlash [8].
No study has examined whether uncertainty is related to
information overload.
The future of uncertainty
The first question that needs to be addressed is whether
lay adults can meaningfully process scientific uncertainty.
Studies examining the positive and negative effects of tex-
tual and discourse-based uncertainty would be especially
useful. Uncertainty management theory posits that people
respond to uncertain information in complex ways (e.g.,
avoidance, engagement, anger, relief, confusion). How peo-
ple respond to uncertainty will likely depend on the type
of uncertainty, how it is communicated, and individual
skill and dispositions [34,46]. From a theoretical stand-
point, the controversy about the USPSTF mammography
guidelines raises questions about the concealment of
uncertainty. Is uncertainty perceived differently if people
believe it was initially downplayed or omitted from dis-
course? The perception that information was withheld
may have detrimental impact on the credibility of the
communicator, as well as identity issues for those who
advocated the original message. Indeed, the mammogra-
phy controversy frustrated many screening advocates who
had personally endorsed a course of action (and message)
that was now being questioned. Understandably, many
screening advocates felt betrayed, embarrassed, and angry.
All of these reactions raise questions about logic and tim-
ing in communicating uncertainty. Of course, only the
aggregation of numerous studies across different contexts,
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time intervals, and forms of uncertainty will yield general-
izable knowledge to guide effective communication prac-
tice [7,8,33,34].
The USPSTF was hindered by a suboptimal communica-
tion strategy about the mammography controversy, but
they may be working in the right direction in a larger
sense. For example, one USPSTF goal is to categorize the
state of knowledge on particular public health issues. Part
of this categorization process is an assessment of the level
of certainty regarding the net benefit of a health behavior.
Evidence is categorized as low, moderate, or high in terms
of certainty (see Table 1 for the criteria of each category
[47]). Categorizing certainty is a potentially useful idea,
and research should investigate public comprehension of
the categories. However, health researchers should also
consider whether the number of categories—three at pre-
sent—is sufficient. The goal is to provide a sufficiently
nuanced categorization scheme to allow researchers to
accurately describe the evolution of a research program. It
could be argued that the categorization scheme currently
used by the USPSTF failed the 2009 Task Force, as their
desired course of action (i.e., a change in the recommen-
dation based on growing uncertainties) could not be prop-
erly conveyed. An alternative categorization scheme could
focus on the state of the research with categories like no
studies, isolated, infancy, emerging, and established. The
model of information overload posits that people need to
categorize information to process scientific research mean-
ingfully [8]; therefore, cultivating a widely recognized and
sufficiently detailed categorization scheme could be a valu-
able addition to public communication of science.
One intriguing area of future research is the study of
visual depictions of uncertainty [48]. Effective visuals may
overcome literacy and numeracy deficits. Visuals could
also convey complexity more efficiently and address space
issues that often drive the streamlining process. The 2009
mammography controversy may have been avoided if
communicators had effective visuals formats for contex-
tualizing the magnitude of uncertainty about mammogra-
phy, especially as that research unfolded over time.
Concerning the latter, a timeline visual depicts key mile-
stones/events in a way that establishes the duration of
activities (years, decades, centuries), evolution of ideas,
and level of uncertainty. In practice, timeline visuals
should encourage both communicators and audiences to
consider the totality of a situation rather than focusing on
the details of the latest event (only). Timelines have only
been in use for approximately 250 years, and the public
initially struggled to comprehend this new visual format
[49]. Social scientific research on the use and efficacy of
this visual format remains in its infancy. There is evidence
that timelines enhance information recall [50], but social
scientific research concerning comprehension is limited.
This is an interesting omission in the research given the
tendency of visual researchers to use timeline-oriented
visuals (e.g., Florence Nightingale’s visual depiction of
deaths during the Crimean War [1853–1856]) as exem-
plars of quality [48]. Visuals may also be ideal to commu-
nicate context for the magnitude of the uncertainty
(henceforth, context-magnitude visuals). Researchers often
use context-magnitude visuals to demonstrate the relative
size of an effect; for example, scholars have contextualized
the relationship between exposure to media violence and
aggression by visual depicting other (weaker, stronger, com-
parable) relationships at the same time [51]. Similar visuals
could be constructed and evaluated for communicating the




High The available evidence usually includes consistent results from well-designed, well-conducted studies in representative primary care
populations. These studies assess the effects of the preventive service on health outcomes. This conclusion is therefore unlikely to
be strongly affected by the results of future studies.
Moderate The available evidence is sufficient to determine the effects of the preventive service on health outcomes, but confidence in the
estimate is constrained by such factors as:
• the number, size, or quality of individual studies
• inconsistency of findings across individual studies
• limited generalizability of findings to routine primary care practice
• lack of coherence in the chain of evidence
As more information becomes available, the magnitude or direction of the observed effect could change, and this change may be
large enough to alter the conclusion.
Low The available evidence is insufficient to assess effects on health outcomes. Evidence is insufficient because of:
• the limited number or size of studies
• important flaws in study design or methods
• inconsistency of findings across individual studies
• gaps in the chain of evidence
• findings that are not generalizable to routine primary care practice
• a lack of information on important health outcomes
More information may allow an estimation of effects on health outcomes.
Note: Evidence regarding the net benefit of health behaviors is categorized as low, moderate, or high using the above criteria.
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magnitude (or even form) of scientific uncertainty in a
given situation. Of course, researchers should also be cau-
tious because there is a risk that communicating uncer-
tainty in this fashion could mislead or confuse target
audiences.
Another promising area for future research is the com-
munication of uncertainty via interactive media. Media
are evolving in ways that challenge traditional journalism
practices including the organization and form of content.
Interactivity allows content to unfold at the discretion of
the consumer, and this provides a vehicle for conveying
complex information to diverse audiences in meaningful
ways [27].
Conclusions
Competition between conflicting opinions is a healthy part
of public discussion in situations defined by uncertainty.
Silencing dissenting opinions when an optimal course of
action is unclear creates a potentially hostile communica-
tion environment. That aside, conflict that derives from
known biases in communication channels is a concern.
Such conflict may stem from systematic efforts to simplify
information for public consumption. Though well inten-
tioned, simplification strategies may have unintentional
negative impacts on certain individuals or population sub-
sets such as the cultivation of fatalism, backlash, and over-
load [8]. Simplification strategies could also undermine or
damage the credibility of the science [7].
Practitioners and media professionals will be interested
in possible solutions. Continued research of uncertainty
management, uncertainty categorization, and visual depic-
tions of uncertainty may identify promising communica-
tion strategies for specific populations and situations.
Until then, communicators should consider the long-term
goals/consequences of their strategies in addition to the
philosophical and ethical foundations of science. Even if
future research suggests that adults with skill deficits
struggle to process uncertainty, and that this contributes
to problems they have in managing their own health care,
communicators will be faced with the challenge of deter-
mining if it is ethical to conceal such information from
populations with literacy deficits or the population as a
whole [34]. Cutting, removing, or simplifying information
for public consumption is (once again) a popular strategy.
Yet, simplification, in and of itself, it is not a virtue of
communication, even if it may be effective at achieving
some goals. Simplification is a message strategy or feature
that can yield positive and negative effects. Rather than
focusing solely on simplification as a goal, communicators
should strive to be meaningful and to embrace strategies
that achieve that goal regardless of their simplicity or com-
plexity. Meaningful health recommendations may need to
include indicators of uncertainty even if doing so sacrifices
short-term adherence for long-term coherence.
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